Tariff Turmoil, Part 2: Steel and Dog Gelato

Tariffs have sparked intense debate in Washington, but their consequences land far from Capitol Hill. Tariffs can shape paychecks, shift prices for consumers, and affect markets. At best, tariffs offer short-term protection for certain industries. At worst, they can uproot the lives of American workers. In this episode, Why It Matters looks at what tariffs mean for a U.S. steel manufacturer and small business owner trying to stay afloat.

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Host
  • Gabrielle Sierra
    Director, Podcasting
Credits

Molly McAnany - Producer

Markus Zakaria - Audio Producer and Sound Designer

Episode Guests
  • Matthew P. Goodman
  • Jamie Sychak
    President of United Auto Workers Local 3303
  • Debbie Hendrickx
    Founder and CEO of Swell Gelato

Show Notes

Regardless of the intention behind them, tariffs carry consequences that reach far beyond the negotiating table. For U.S. steel manufacturers, tariffs could be a lifeline in a highly competitive global market. But for small business owners whose supply chain costs could skyrocket because of import taxes, tariffs can make or break their business.

 

This season, Why It Matters is taking you through the ins and outs of trade. In part two of our episode on tariffs, Why It Matters unpacks the trade-offs of tariffs, how tariffs could protect and preserve the U.S. steel industry, and how a small business faces uncertainty in new markets.

 

 

From CFR

 

Benn Steil and Elisabeth Harding, “Steel Productivity Has Plummeted Since Trump’s 2018 Tariffs

 

Dr. Christopher W. Smart, “Tariff Strategies Don’t Cause Inflation, But Trade Wars Do

 

James Wallar, “Congress: Retake Control of Tariffs and Let Businesses Get Back to the “Vision Thing”

 

Jonathan E. Hillman, “Chips, Steel, and Lawnmowers: What Trade Is Strategic?

 

Shannon K. O'Neil and Julia Huesa, “What Trump’s Aluminum and Steel Tariffs Will Mean, in Six Charts” 

 

From Our Guest

 

Matthew P. Goodman and Allison J. Smith, “American Views on Economic Leadership,” CFR.org

 

Matthew P. Goodman and Allison J. Smith, “How Countries Stack Up on Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs,” CFR.org

 

Read More

 

Timothy Aeppel, “Tariffs May Mean More U.S. Steel Jobs. Will There Be Workers to Fill Them?,” Reuters


Megan Cerullo, “Small Business Owners Push for Exemptions From Trump’s Tariffs,” CBS News

Trade

Global trade tensions are boiling over and questions about the United States’ economic future are at the center of the debate. As trade experts question what comes next, it’s important to analyze how the United States got to this point. How have the current administration’s trade policies of today reshaped the global order of tomorrow?

U.S. Trade Deficit

The United States has had a trade deficit, meaning we import more than we export, for the past fifty years. But recently the trade deficit has become a front-burner issue for President Donald Trump and a core reason for his administration’s sweeping tariff policy. When do trade deficits become a problem? Is the United States already at the tipping point?

Trade

With allies and adversaries alike impacted by new economic barriers and tariffs, the global map of U.S. trade relationships hangs in question. As the U.S. rethinks its commitments with its trading partners, allies may seek deals elsewhere, even with historic rivals. Can the president single-handedly tear up a trade deal, and what happens when deals that took decades to craft are suddenly up for renegotiation?

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Europe

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Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.