The India-Pakistan Crisis, With Šumit Ganguly

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox. I'm Jim Lindsay, the Mary and David Boies distinguished senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the India-Pakistan crisis. With me to discuss the origins of the recent military clash between nuclear powers India and Pakistan, and the durability of the current ceasefire is Sumit Ganguly. Sumit is a senior fellow and directs the Huntington Program on strengthening U.S.-India relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. A specialist on the contemporary politics of South Asia, he has written and edited twenty books on the region. He recently wrote a piece for Foreign Policy titled, What is the Risk of a Conflict Spiral Between India and Pakistan? Sumit, thank you for joining me on The President's Inbox.

GANGULY:
Thank you very much, Jim, for this opportunity.

LINDSAY:
Sumit, the clash between India and Pakistan came two weeks after five armed terrorists attacked and killed twenty-six people, mostly tourists near Pahalgam in the Indian-administered portion of Jammu in Kashmir. What do we know about the attackers?

GANGULY:
What we do know about the attacks is that based on their own admission, it was an organization called the Resistance Front that carried it out. It is also known that the Resistance Front is an offshoot of a well-known Pakistan-based terrorist organization, the Lashkar-e-Taiba. And since they claimed responsibility, there is no reason to believe that they were not behind this attack. What was particularly striking about this attack is that they segregated men and women and then proceeded to ask the men to recite certain key verses from the Quran, and if they failed to recite these verses, they were shot in cold blood.

LINDSAY:
Okay. So it was clearly a religiously-motivated attack. And you mentioned Lashkar-e-Taiba. That was the same group responsible for the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai that killed a hundred and sixty-six people, correct?

GANGULY:
That is correct. It is the same organization that was responsible for the November, 2008 attack. It was a swarming terrorist attack directed at least at multiple sites in the city of Mumbai.

LINDSAY:
So Sumit, help me understand the way the current Modi government has responded to these attacks against the backdrop—in 2008, a different Indian government did not choose to respond against Pakistan for the attacks that happened in Mumbai. And even I think in 2019, there was a suicide bombing in Kashmir that killed forty Indian soldiers. And Narendra Modi was prime minister at the time and decided not to retaliate against Pakistan. This time he did, help me understand why?

GANGULY:
In considerable part, two factors are involved. One, in 2008, the terrorist attack was protracted. It lasted for at least three to four days before the Indians restored control over the city. And consequently, any element of surprise was lost. India could have retaliated, considered retaliation, but ultimately decided not to in large part because no doubt Pakistan had placed its forces on alert and thereby could blunt any Indian attack. Furthermore, you had a government that had made considerable efforts to reach some kind of reconciliation with Pakistan, and there was divided counsel on how to respond to the issue. So that's the first point.
The second point is that Modi had placed himself in a rhetorical trap. For the last several years, he had been claiming that normalcy has been restored to Kashmir, that tourists are flocking to Kashmir. The level of violence has come down in Kashmir, and infrastructure is being rapidly developed in Kashmir. And as a consequence of this, when this vicious terrorist attack took place, Modi had to demonstrate that he was willing to respond with considerable vigor. Political scientists refer to this as audience costs. That there would be significant audience costs, he would pay an electoral price if he did not demonstrate that he could respond robustly against this heinous terrorist attack.

LINDSAY:
So Sumit, help me understand the nature of the attack that India launched. It did take two weeks before launching its attack, which in many ways negated any element of surprise. I think raised some questions among some people who follow Indian affairs as to why the Modi government didn't have an off-the-shelf option ready to go. So help me understand a little bit about the taking the two weeks, and then exactly what is it that India did in its retaliation?

GANGULY:
It is fascinating that you raise the issue of India lacking an off-the-shelf option. As we both know, all military organizations have standard operating procedures that they visualize, they simulate, they think through scenarios to which they have to respond rather than sitting down and thinking, "Oh dear, this attack took place. What are our possible options? Let's carefully weigh each one of them." No, that's not what professional militaries do. And this raises an interesting question, which is still unanswered about Indian civil military relations. Why wasn't an off-the-shelf option, which could be modified to suit the circumstances unavailable to India? And this is something that will be worth exploring in the weeks and months ahead.
The only defense that one can come up with for the duration of time, it took the Modi government to respond, and this is perhaps the most charitable explanation that is they deliberately wanted to create a degree of ambiguity about when they were going to attack and where they might attack. And that's perhaps the most charitable explanation that one can come up with. What is striking in the response was that India breached several thresholds which have not been breached since the 1971 war with Pakistan.

LINDSAY:
So walk me through that Sumit. What were the thresholds and what's different about this particular confrontation?

GANGULY:
The principal threshold it breached was twofold. One, the resort to the use of air power and not just the use of air power, the use of extensive drones, both loitering drones and suicidal drones. And in addition to that, it attacked the Pakistani heartland. Something it didn't do even in 1999 when there was a colossal intelligence failure and significant Pakistani incursions had taken place in a disputed region in extreme northwestern India.

LINDSAY:
This was the Kargil War?

GANGULY:
During the Kargil War of 1999. That's correct. India scrupulously limited the use of air power to its side of what is called the line of control, the facto international border in the disputed state. It never attacked a single target inside Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War. On this occasion, it struck an air base just outside Pakistan's military headquarters, and it is widely believed perilously close to Pakistan's nuclear command authority.

LINDSAY:
So what do you make of that decision? Why the decision to go beyond what had been traditional, for example, firing artillery across the border and the like? Because as you point out, when you start going at military facilities, near military headquarters, that clearly raises the stakes. And the backdrop for all of this is that Pakistan, like India has nuclear weapons. So what do you think the thinking of the Modi government was in breaching what had been a line Indian governments had not been willing to cross for more than fifty years?

GANGULY:
I think there are three factors involved. One, this government is much more risk prone and far more acceptant of the utility of force to resolve conflicts. Number two, I think it also reflected the degree of frustration that previous pinprick attacks or responses haven't really worked. So now we have given Pakistan a bloody nose. This was a view that Modi wanted to convey particularly to his core constituency.

LINDSAY:
Sumit, you've pointed out there is a real risk of having a conflict spiral and getting to levels that you don't want to get to. How close did we come to seeing this conflict spiral out of control? Were we ever really close to the two countries using their nuclear weapons?

GANGULY:
There's an emerging debate about this. Some have argued that the risks were exceedingly high and especially since India struck Pakistani military bases, that Pakistan used something like three hundred drones to attack not just along the line of control, but also across the Indian border, resulting sadly, in mostly civilian casualties, only a handful of military personnel and local officials who were killed. So one view suggests that there was a real risk of a spiral. On the other hand, Indians and particularly a number of Indian analysts have been arguing that we need to challenge this notion that simply because Pakistan has a declaratory doctrine that eschews the no first use of nuclear weapons, that we cannot be held back because of this.
And this demonstrates quite convincingly that a spiral leading to the use of nuclear weapons will not take place. The jury is still out on this subject. My view of this is somewhat eclectic. I recognize the risks of miscalculation, misperception and misjudgment, but on the other hand, as you know only too well, nuclear weapons produce a certain concentration of mind that ultimately both sides have no interest in violating the nuclear taboo.

LINDSAY:
Well, that's always the question, Sumit, of how close you can come to the edge without falling into the abyss. What I found striking was that in at least one instance, the Indians went after Pakistani air defenses. And oftentimes when countries take out some other country's air defenses, that is a prelude to a much bigger attack. So that strikes me as the Indian military or political decision makers willing to run a significant risk because obviously Pakistan could have anticipated or expected something that in fact did not materialize. And that's the essence of a spiral dynamic.

GANGULY:
That is correct. I found it extremely bold on the part of the Indians to suppress the air defenses of Pakistan, and particularly in the capital city of Lahore, the capital city of the state of Punjab, which is the largest and most powerful state in Pakistan that it attacked. And not just air defenses, but there are reports which are still unconfirmed, that they effectively destroyed much of Pakistan's radar facilities, thereby blinding Pakistan. And that has certain inherent risks.

LINDSAY:
Certainly, if those air defenses and those radars remain down for quite a while, that could put the Pakistani military on a hair trigger or alert because they are blind.

GANGULY:
Yeah. That's exactly right. And then the temptation to at least use tactical nuclear weapons, which Pakistan has invested in heavily over the last several years would have been very, very tempting.

LINDSAY:
So Sumit, as you look at this, how do you assess the outcome of this set of clashes? And I don't know whether it's a round or it's going to be part of a series of clashes going forward. I have read analysts arguing that India has reestablished deterrence precisely because it was willing to go beyond red lines that had existed before. I've read other people arguing that at the end of the day, this military clash was at best a draw. And that for the Indians, any military clash that ends as draw is essentially a loss. And they note that the Indians lost two of their best fighter jets. And that as you look at it, the argument would be that India's ambitions to be a global power are dented by this because it still has this problem with its neighbor Pakistan that has been there since the inception of the two countries back in 1947. How do you read that debate?

GANGULY:
I think it's too early to assert that deterrence has been reestablished. Certainly, those of a hawkish disposition in India would be tempted to argue that, that we have breached certain hitherto sacrosanct lines. And look, the crisis did not escalate. We managed the crisis, we contained the crisis. So a suitable message has been delivered to the Pakistani military. I am a bit skeptical about that precisely because of the issue that you raised. We know that at least two and possibly five Indian aircraft ranging from a Rafale to a MiG-29 were shot down by Pakistan. And it also raises interesting questions about the capabilities that Pakistan has acquired since the 1999 Kargil War when it could not shoot down a single Indian aircraft.
And while I do not want to suggest that, as some analysts have, that China-Pakistan security nexus has given Pakistan access to certain weapons technologies which can easily challenge their Western counterparts, I think it is too premature to make that argument. We don't know how far Indian aircraft entered Pakistani airspace, if they did enter Pakistani airspace, if there were actual dogfights. There are too many questions that remain to be answered. So I think it's a premature rush to judgment to say that China has somehow leapfrogged advanced industrial states in the West in terms of military capabilities because it was really Chinese missiles and aircraft that engaged the Indian Air Force, and successfully inflicted certain casualties. We need to know much more about the battle space before we can make an informed firm judgment.

LINDSAY:
Fair point, Sumit. Let me ask you the flip side of the question, which is why do you think both Pakistan and India were quick to strike a ceasefire rather than to let the military confrontation play out a bit longer?

GANGULY:
Some have argued, and certainly the Trump administration has argued, that they played a critical role in inducing both parties to come to a quick ceasefire. We do not have adequate information about the role of the Trump administration, even though we do know that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, did call both parties and also Vice President Vance after initially suggesting that we don't have a dog in this fight, apparently also made phone calls. I do not know to what extent these phone calls were efficacious in terms of inducing the two parties to stand down.
The Indians certainly are dismissing the role of the United States in bringing about a ceasefire, but it's in their self-interest to say so. So one has to be skeptical about their categorical denial of the role of the United States. Certainly, after distancing itself from this crisis, the U.S. it appears to me realized that it cannot simply walk away from a crisis in South Asia. So I think that at least the U.S. met the Hippocratic standard, do no harm, but we still don't know for a certainty that it was a concerted American role that led to the ceasefire.

LINDSAY:
Do we have any sense, Sumit, whether in these phone calls from Secretary of State Rubio and Vice President Vance, that they offered carrots to both sides versus sticks, we have any sense of what was said or we simply know that phone calls were made and that's the end of it for now?

GANGULY:
At the moment, all we know is that there were no sticks that were wielded, but a carrot was offered, but a one-sided carrot. And this is a bit distressing because certainly, Vice President Vance and Secretary Rubio should have been appropriately briefed on the matter because Secretary Rubio specifically said that we can mediate and end the underlying sources of this conflict, and we can meet in a neutral arena. This is absolutely anathema to India, and a much weaker India decades ago fended off these pressures. And to invoke this revealed either a lack of awareness or downright ignorance of India's new neuralgic reaction to the idea of third-party mediation.

LINDSAY:
Sumit, help me understand that. Help me understand why it is that Delhi has long resisted this idea of having others come in offering their good offices to try to resolve this long-running dispute, which has been a problem for India going on seventy years?

GANGULY:
That is exactly correct, but what explains it? It goes back to 1948 when India referred the Kashmir case to the United Nations, and very quickly it became embroiled in the politics of the Cold War. And India made highly legalistic arguments before the UN, whereas the Pakistanis very deftly made political arguments, and it's the political arguments that carried the day, and that experience that India had at the United Nations scarred an entire generation. And subsequent generations have been reminded of that episode.
And furthermore, after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the U.S. and Britain tried to induce India to enter into talks with Pakistan to settle the Kashmir dispute. Averell Harriman, who was a noted American diplomat and also a distinguished governor of the state of New York and Duncan Sands, who was a British member of parliament and the commonwealth secretary, went to India and Pakistan and persuaded New Delhi to enter into talks with Pakistan. Six rounds of talks were held. They ultimately ended up in an impasse. But again, the memory of foreign pressure to talk to Pakistan really rankles in the minds of the Indians even today.

LINDSAY:
But I would imagine it may even be stronger today. India positions itself as an emerging power, as a great power. And the notion for any great power to have someone else come in and solve your problems is to be resisted. I can't imagine the United States is particularly open to having others come in and say, "We can solve your problems for you." So I think the Indian position is understandable.

GANGULY:
I think that that factor is all just simply reinforces their inherent opposition to third party intervention.

LINDSAY:
Well, talking about third parties, do we know what role, if any, China played in this? China has been a backer of Pakistan for quite some time. You mentioned that the Chinese have provided the Pakistanis with considerable military technology. We're unsure to what extent that played a role in the most recent round of fighting. But any evidence that Beijing tried to exercise its good offices?

GANGULY:
No. Quite the contrary. It provided full-throated support to Pakistan diplomatically, and did not even suggest that both parties need to sober up and not allow this crisis to spin out of control. And furthermore, there are allegations emerging that they provided... I've seen a series of press reports to this end and not from dubious sources, which suggests that China provided real-time intelligence to Pakistan about Indian capabilities and movements.

LINDSAY:
Any speculation, Sumit, as to why the Chinese would do this? I will note that India is part of the BRICS, which China champions, though I also understand that China and India have their own contestation of their borders in the Himalayas.

GANGULY:
That's precisely one reason why. And in addition to that, since about 1963, even though the relationship has waxed and waned a bit over the years, China and Pakistan have what the Chinese characterize as an all-weather relationship. China is one of Pakistan's few staunch unyielding allies. They see the United States as extremely fickle because we have on occasion walked away from Pakistan when our interests no longer necessitated an engagement with Pakistan, whereas they see the Chinese as a staunch, unwavering ally. And of course, the convergence of Chinese and Pakistani interests because India is a common adversary.

LINDSAY:
So Sumit, where do you see things going from here? And I'll ask first, in terms of Indian policy. I will note that Delhi has suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, it's a treaty that governs the usage of Indus River waters, which is critical to Pakistan. The waters originate in Indian territory and eventually go into Pakistan. I think eighty percent of Pakistani farms depend upon these waters. How significant is this decision by Delhi to say it's going to suspend its participation in the treaty?

GANGULY:
It's very significant because the figure varies. Some people say eighty, some people say ninety percent of Pakistan's agriculture is dependent on the steady flow of waters. Again, there are two issues that need to be highlighted. Number one, the Indus Waters treaty to some degree is an anachronism owing to climate change. There simply isn't enough water under the terms of the treaty to be supplied to Pakistan. Furthermore, the offtake of water on the Indian side has increased because of population growth since 1960. And consequently, this is a treaty that really needs to be renegotiated and thought through using appropriate hydrological evidence. But that's not about to happen in this particular climate.

LINDSAY:
I was going say, this is not the best of contexts in which to negotiate such sensitive decisions.

GANGULY:
No, this is hardly the appropriate context. I have talked to a couple of people who know more about hydrology than I do, and they tell me that one can lower the sluice gates and stop the flow of the water. But this cannot continue indefinitely because once the monsoons come, you cannot hold the water back behind the dams. You'll have to release the water, or you could challenge the structural integrity of the dam with devastating consequences for your own population. So if India is serious about undermining the treaty, then it will have to take on a much longer, much more aggressive policy, which would involve building more dams on those—

LINDSAY:
You would really have to increase the infrastructure on the Indian side, and I believe the treaty actually limits it.

GANGULY:
Yeah.

LINDSAY:
It takes time to build dams and floodplains and the rest of it. It's not something you conjure up overnight. Let me close, Sumit, if I can, by looking at the flip side of this conversation. We have a pretty good understanding of Indian politics and is a democracy. You have Prime Minister Modi, who's been the dominant political figure in India. Do we have a really good understanding of who is running Pakistan? It nominally has a civilian leadership. I often read that it's dominated by the military or army chief of staff. Do we know who's really calling the shots in Pakistan?

GANGULY:
Yes, we do. The structure of civil military relations within Pakistan is such that it's the overweening presence of the military that really matters. It's the military that primarily calls the shots. And General Munir, Asim Munir, who's the latest chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, gave a speech which was quite bilious barely a week before in the attack in Kashmir, invoked the spirit of the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had claimed that Hindus and Muslims are implacably at odds and that they constitute two primordial nations who cannot possibly come to any kind of accommodation or understanding. And he invoked much of the language of Jinnah's famous speech from the 1940s, which suggests a degree of bellicosity towards India that his predecessor, General Bajwa did not show. And for decades, the military has been the ultimate arbiter of key foreign and security policy decisions.

LINDSAY:
That sounds like you're painting a very pessimistic picture to me.

GANGULY:
Unfortunately, yes. And Modi, as I mentioned earlier in my remarks, is caught in a rhetorical trap of his own making, having insisted that his policies have brought normalcy to Kashmir. And having witnessed this attack, which has been publicized across India, especially on social media, he cannot now appear to be conciliatory or to make any gesture of understanding towards Pakistan.

LINDSAY:
On that very sobering note, I'm going to close up this episode of The President's Inbox. My guest has been Sumit Ganguly, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an emeritus distinguished professor of political science at Indiana University. Sumit, thank you very much for joining me today.

GANGULY:
Thank you again, Jim, for this opportunity.

LINDSAY:
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