Conflict in Eastern Congo, With Mvemba Dizolele

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox. I'm Jim Lindsay, the Mary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the conflict in Eastern Congo.
With me to discuss the renewed fighting in the Eastern Congo that pits the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, against the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele. Mvemba is a senior fellow and director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also a lecturer in African studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He has served as an election monitor in multiple countries and reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo alongside UN peacekeepers. His writings have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the New York Times. He also hosts CSIS's Into Africa Podcast, which I highly recommend to you.
Mvemba, thank you for joining me on The President's Inbox.

DIZOLELE:
Thank you, Jim, for having me. Pleasure.

LINDSAY:
Mvemba, I'd like you to help me understand the recent surge of fighting in the Eastern Congo that has killed, by some estimates, as many as seven thousand people. Who is doing the fighting? And what are they fighting over?

DIZOLELE:
Jim, that's the one-million-dollar question. As you know, this has been going on for thirty years. So somewhere along the line, we lost track of exactly of why people are fighting. If you talk to the M23, which is the big group that is fighting with the support of Rwanda, as the United States and other powers have established, they will say they're fighting because there's the FDLR, which is a remnant of people who committed the genocide in 1994, who fled to Congo. They will also say that the minority Rwandophones, as they call them, have been discriminated, that their rights have not been protected, particularly their rights as citizens, and therefore this is why they're coming.
Those are the two major issues that have been advanced by Rwanda as a backer of those groups and by those groups themselves. And they also will say, the M23 element, that they had an agreement with President Felix Tshisekedi of the DRC, that the president has reneged. Those are the three main issues that come up most often.

LINDSAY:
You mentioned, Mvemba, that this conflict has deep historical roots going back thirty years. Maybe you could just sort of give us a quick overview of what has happened in those thirty years. I suspect most people are familiar with the horrific genocide in Rwanda that began back in 1994, but people may be hazier on the conflicts that arose out of that across the border. Because we had a first Congo war, a second Congo war, and that latter war killed an estimated six million people and is probably the deadliest single conflict around the globe since the end of World War II. So maybe if you could help us understand a little bit about that history.

DIZOLELE:
Jim, the starting point, as you rightly pointed out, is the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. We remember that killed around eight hundred thousand people. It's the genocide that targeted the Tutsi, but in which a lot of Hutus also died. And during that, it took about one hundred days, and during that crisis, about two million Rwandans had fled to Congo. They fled into all the neighboring countries, Tanzania, Burundi, and so on, but focusing on Congo, about two million fled to Congo. And among them, you had the entire Rwandan army with its arsenal. You had the central bank with its reserves that had relocated in Congo. And you have hundreds and hundreds of thousands of civilians who also fled.
The challenge was that a lot of the people who fled were civilians, but the hardcore, as I said, were armed forces and then also a militia called the Interahamwe that had been involved in the killing of civilians, particularly the Tutsis. Eventually, this group that went to Congo started launching an incursion into Rwanda from the refugee camps. And Rwanda complained at the time and saying, "This is not acceptable." Part of the problem is the refugee camps and the UNHCR and other NGOs did not respect the required twelve mile distance that you have to set between refugee camps and the country of origin. So it allowed this group the proximity they needed to do whatever they were doing as operations.
That eventually led to a coalition. First, the Rwandans, but then the coalitions of armed forces in the region, the Rwandans, the Tanzanians, the Ugandans, the Eritreans, the Angolans, who pretty much, to use a vernacular, ganged up on Congo. The Rwandans, of course, had a clear sense of what they wanted. They wanted to chase these people who had committed genocide. But for the other countries that were part of the coalition, it was literally a chance to settle scores with the president of Congo at the time, Mobutu Sese Seko, who had been in power for thirty-two years, had been a larger-than-life person, but also a key element in the Cold War.
As a key actor in the Cold War, he was kind of the would-be hegemon in the region. I'm using that term loosely here. Congo is a big country, the U.S. particularly relied on him for a set of Cold War security dynamics. But he was old, he was dying. He had mismanaged the country by that time, the DRC, Zaire, as it was called. So people wanted to get rid of him and his own people internally were just comfortable to see him go.
So this coalition of troops with a front called the AFDL, A-F-D-L, with a leader named Laurent-Desire Kabila, who had been in the bush for thirty years himself. Had actually fought alongside Che Guevara when Che Guevara showed up in Congo. They toppled Mobutu. Kabila became president, but quickly Kabila fell out with his backers in Uganda and Rwanda. He kicked the Rwandans out. And after that, the Rwandans decided to support a rebellion under the acronym of RCD. And then the Ugandans also supported another rebellion under the acronym of MLC, with a fellow named Jean-Pierre Bemba.
So that war would go on for a good five years, from 1998 to 2003, until the Congolese came together in South Africa into something called the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. And they set up a new government and they set themselves on the transitional path to democracy, to the elections in 2006. Meanwhile, the RCD continued and the RCD will then spawn what was called the CNDP.

LINDSAY:
We're getting a lot of initials and acronyms here.

DIZOLELE:
Right. It's alphabet soup, we call it. So after the RCD, we had the CNDP with a fellow, a leader named Laurent Nkunda. And then after that, we had M23. M23 won in 2012, and now we have M23 too.
But in between, Jim, one thing we need to point out, which we hear a lot, is that Eastern Congo is home to forty to one hundred and twenty armed groups. Those armed groups did not exist before the genocide. They didn't exist before the coalition attacked Congo. They emerged as a response to the Rwanda-backed RCD, primarily, because they're considered local defense forces.

LINDSAY:
So help me understand that, Mvemba. Are these militias based on ethnic or tribal divisions, family divisions? Just people coming together because of location? How do you think about all these groups?

DIZOLELE:
It's all of the above because they consider local defense forces, in some areas, they take the ethnic color. In some areas, it's just the reality of the place. They say, "We need to defend our area," so it can be a coalition. It's never straightforward.

LINDSAY:
So why do we think the fighting has flared up in 2025?

DIZOLELE:
In 2025, remember this started almost around 2023, then these groups start mobilizing calling themselves M23. If you ask the Rwandans, they will say, "Well, the Congolese army allied itself with the element of the FDLR. They start fighting, they co-opted them into the Congolese army. Therefore, this was unacceptable to us. We had to intervene to root them out because this is a genocidal force. We need to do something."
If you ask the M23, they will say, "We've been waiting here for a long time. In fact, there are thousands of refugees who come from Congo. We just want to come home, and that's it."

LINDSAY:
So help me understand where you think this might be going. The M23 leadership has talked about marching all the way to Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo. But that's about a thousand miles away, I don't know whether this is a real threat or an empty bluff or something in between. But do you see sort of the scope of the fighting widening in the weeks and months to come?

DIZOLELE:
It's hard to say now. As I said earlier, this has been going on for thirty years. So on one level, we do have the empirical evidence. We have observed these groups over the last thirty years. We know what they do. They come out strong, they threaten, they kill people. They lay siege on cities. And then after that, there is a stalemate. And then often, that stalemate means they want to be discussing positions and posts with the government in Kinshasa. Some of them want to be generals in the Congolese army, which they may become. Some of them want to be ministers, they ask for posts. So it's really a time to divide up the cake. That has been the norm.
The other idea that you mentioned is marching to Kinshasa. That only happened once. It happened in 1997. The circumstances were different. As I said earlier, Mobutu was tired, he was sick. People were tired of him. There was a coalition of forces, so they marched. The circumstances this time are a bit different, so that's why we need to wait and see. There is no coalition of forces wanting to get rid of Tshisekedi.

LINDSAY:
So for example, M23 doesn't have an ideological or ethnic appeal or tie to people in, let's say, Western Congo?

DIZOLELE:
No, because the M23 is primarily seen as a Tutsi group, Rwanda-backed. Because it's seen as a Tutsi group and is Rwanda-backed, that is already a very limiting appeal that they can project anywhere else.
But also, the Congolese people at large are tired of war. Remember, Congo has been dabbling in democracy since 2006. It may not work as well, but that's where the national mindset is. The notion of taking power at the barrel of the gun is not appealing to people across the country. The Kivus have been embroiled in this conflict for a long time, it's not worked well for them.

LINDSAY:
And Kivu is the name of the provinces or region of Congo that we're talking about?

DIZOLELE:
Correct. So the two Kivus, they border Rwanda, both of them, north and south. Goma is the provincial capital of North Kivu, and Bukavu is the provincial capital city of South Kivu.

LINDSAY:
And M23 is taking control of both of those cities.

DIZOLELE:
And M23 is taking control of both. Now, M23 can possibly take Katanga, which is south of the Kivus. They can also take part of Ituri up in the north. But at this point, we cannot see a rallying of the people around the M23, in part because it's so divisive as a position. The M23 leaders will say, "We are not just Tutsis. We are a national segment of the country." That may be true, but that's not how the people perceive them, particularly with the backing of Rwanda.

LINDSAY:
And I should just note that the Democratic Republic of Congo is not only a big country geographically, it is a very large country in terms of population. Population is something on the order of one hundred and fifteen million people, but it's quite diverse in terms of the ethnic makeup of the country.

DIZOLELE:
Correct. And that is a problem for the likes of M23 because they use the discourse of a minority that has been discriminated. Therefore, we need to come and protect them. The DRC is a country of anywhere between two hundred and fifty and four hundred and fifty ethnic groups, so there is no majority. So when somebody claimed that they've been discriminated because the majority, it may sound very alarming in the West, because we hear Tutsi, we think of the genocide in Rwanda. It doesn't play that way in Congo, it doesn't play that way in other African countries because there's no majority to dominate anyone in Congo.

LINDSAY:
Mvemba, tell me a little bit about the role that minerals and particularly critical minerals are playing in this conflict. The DRC is home to some of the world's largest reserves of metals, in rare earth minerals, cobalt, coltan, lithium, copper, zinc, the list goes on, and many of these elements are used in making modern electronic products. I get a sense that a lot of this fighting is about who gets control of those resources and the riches that come from them.

DIZOLELE:
That is correct. So originally, Jim, the minerals were not the primary driver of this conflict. As I said, Rwanda had legitimate claims to be upset, grievances about the FDLR, about Interahamwe. So there was a security component that was very clear.
And the other groups were more interested in defending their own turf. As you asked earlier, it could be ethnic, it can be just the region as they've all been overrun by foreigners. Why not? And then you had countries like Uganda that had its own imperatives to go into Congo.
But thirty years later, that's not the case. Now, Rwanda, for instance, is the largest exporter of mineral resources that it doesn't have.

LINDSAY:
It's getting those mineral resources from Congo, correct?

DIZOLELE:
Exactly. So these are resources from Congo. Rwanda has made a lot of money through that. Uganda is done the same with gold, they become a large exporter of gold. That gold is coming from Congo.
So while there are other reasons for people to get involved in this conflict, the mines have become a lucrative business that people want to control as well. And I don't think Rwanda is any different when it comes to this because if you visit Kigali, it's an emerging city with a lot of wealth coming up. And as I said, you cannot make that wealth out of foreign aid. That's not where it's coming from. It's coming from the DRC.
And unfortunately, I think these war economic operators, as I will call them, and it's not just government, but the groups of people are making money out of this. There's a war economy on both sides of the border. They've taken tests to this, they've tested this, and they want to continue. There is an opportunity now actually to make real peace, because peace has not really been tried. It's not been given a chance.
It's very easy to talk about war. There is a bit of what I'll call irrational exuberance about this conflict. Everybody talks about, "Wow, what's going to be next? Are they going to go to Kinshasa? What will Kagame do next? What will Museveni do?" It's exciting, particularly for those of us in the analytical world, the think tanks and the news and so on.
But the question is really, we've had thirty years of this, to what end? That's the question that I'm grappling with. What for? And what has been missing as a response to that question is they've not been a serious peace initiative in the region, and that's what we need at this point.

LINDSAY:
Mvemba, I want to get to the potential for a serious peace initiative. But before we do that, I want to ask you about one other actor that, as I understand it, is quite active in Congo and in East Congo, and that is China. China has taken very large positions in the mining field. It's one of the reasons why China has what some people regard as a near stranglehold on the production, refining, and distribution of rare earth elements. So help me understand where China plays or doesn't play a role in the conflict we're witnessing today.

DIZOLELE:
You have described it well. China has a strong grip on the mineral sector of DRC. But China is not where the fighting is. China is in the province below, what they call the Katanga space. So Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, this is kind of the backbone, if you will, of the copper, cobalt mining sector. That's where China is, along with the other giants like Glencore and others, because that's where you find a lot of the organized structured mineral ventures.
The Kivus are heavily dominated by artisanal mining. In as much as the Chinese there, they're independent operators who came from China on their own. So you will not find big concerns backed by the government of China in the Kivus. That may change, but that's not where we are today. Today, it's heavily dominated by independent operators, Chinese and others.

LINDSAY:
Do we see any activity by Beijing's diplomats to try to mediate in the conflict in the Kivus?

DIZOLELE:
I'm not aware of that. Although, China is friend to both sides of the conflict here. China is close to Rwanda, China is close to Uganda, and China is close to the DRC. But I'm not aware of any effort that is public, that is known, trying to mediate the peace.

LINDSAY:
Mvemba, help me understand what it is that the Trump administration either is doing or might consider doing given the conflict in the Eastern Congo? And I ask that question against the backdrop of some news stories suggesting that the Trump administration is interested in a possible deal with the DRC on critical minerals.

DIZOLELE:
The United States used to have a very strong relationship with DRC, especially during the years known as the Zaire years, the Mobutu years. That eventually kind of fizzled out after Mobutu left, and the U.S. focused mostly on the humanitarian side of things, a large number of IDPs internally displaced people, and just all the crisis that comes with fighting. Recently, the U.S. has decided that critical minerals are a strategic part of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. defense.

LINDSAY:
It's obviously shown up in the issue of U.S. policy-

DIZOLELE:
Exactly.

LINDSAY:
... toward Ukraine.

DIZOLELE:
So that's part of that. So as of late, there have been a lot of talks between DRC, at least rumors, we should say, and reports, because these have not been formalized in any way, where the people in the DRC who are thinking they should offer the United States special access to mining there so that the U.S. then can weigh heavily on the security side of the ledger.

LINDSAY:
I think the word we're supposed to use here is "overtures".

DIZOLELE:
There we go, overtures. They're making overtures to the U.S.. But be that as it may, we know that we've heard of the appointment of a special envoy. This is President Trump's, how do we characterize? His son married President Trump's daughter.

LINDSAY:
Yes.

DIZOLELE:
Yeah? This fellow is a Lebanese-Nigerian, I presume now American, who is very well introduced in the business world. His family in Nigeria dealt in automotive and automobile business. So he's been appointed to be the kind of the head, the special envoy for this specific issue, which, of course is front and center in the Great Lakes. We are waiting to see, to get the details of that. It's been reported in the media outlet. But beyond that, not much has transpired.

LINDSAY:
As I understand it, the Trump administration has slapped some sanctions on Rwandan senior government officials, and I believe the spokesperson for the M23 rebel movement. I'm not sure how significant that move is or isn't.

DIZOLELE:
The U.S. imposed sanctions on those two individuals. One is James Kabarebe, who has been a lot of things in Rwanda. He's been chief of defense staff, He's been minister of defense. He's currently a state minister for foreign affairs in charge of regional integration. And then the second person is the spokesperson. So the most significant of the two is General James Kabarebe, because James Kabarebe is really close to President Kagame. It's as close you can get to President Kagame in this kind of business.
So in that sense, it's a big signal that the U.S. is willing to take a stand over these issues. The question is how much impact will it have on what is happening now? Is General Kabarebe a rich man who has a lot of assets in the U.S. or deals in dollars? We don't know. But the symbolism of the sanctions, it's tremendous.

LINDSAY:
It's a signal of displeasure.

DIZOLELE:
It's absolutely that, and it sends a strong message because Rwanda is also close to the United States. This is the part that we've not discussed. Rwanda is considered a partner of the United States. They do a lot of security exports on behalf of the world and behalf of the U.S.. They are in the Central African Republic where they provide bilateral, but also through the UN. They are in Mozambique where they fight Al-Shabab. So it's a bit challenging to see how the sanctions will affect the relationship because both sides need each other.

LINDSAY:
It highlights how complicated the ties are, the sort of cross-cutting pressures. And on that score, Mvemba, tell me a little bit about the role that European countries or the EU as a single entity is playing in this space. Because I've read some reports that suggest that from the vantage point of the Democratic Republic of Congo, European involvement has been unhelpful.

DIZOLELE:
The EU particularly, as a bloc, has come under serious criticism and pressure because they recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Rwanda on the provision of mining. So the provision is such as they will be buying minerals from Rwanda under this memorandum of understanding, Rwanda will be one of the primary suppliers in the region.

LINDSAY:
And the EU knows that the minerals originated in Congo, not in Rwanda.

DIZOLELE:
Exactly. Everybody knows that Rwanda does not have large reserves of these minerals. By signing this memorandum of understanding, analysts suppose this was a green light to Rwanda to continue doing what it's doing in the east, in Eastern DRC. And part of it is, in fact, the M23 took over one of the largest area where reserves of coltan is.
So the challenge then is the EU playing a negative role in encouraging Rwanda in this way? There have been tremendous discussions within the parliament of the EU, and the EU has been considering a revision of this MOU, the segment of the EU parliament that is calling for the cancellation of this MOU. So time will tell us how they work this out, but their role has not been positive. Even countries like France, which is close on both side, can play a better role than what they're playing now.

LINDSAY:
What about the role that African countries are playing in the conflict? You mentioned earlier, Mvemba, that a number of countries in Africa saw, decades ago, the opportunity essentially to gang up on what was then Zaire to settle old scores. My understanding right now is that South Africa had had troops in Eastern Congo supporting the Congolese army. But after those troops were killed or some of the troops were killed back in January, that South Africa chose to withdraw its troops. What kind of regional or Africa-centric diplomacy are we seeing?

DIZOLELE:
African countries are divided over these issues. You have countries in the EAC, for instance, the East African Community, to which Rwanda and the DRC belong. You have Kenya, you have Uganda, you have all these countries. The challenge is how do you have a regional economic community where some countries are invading others, they're fighting each other? So that itself has not worked well.
It makes it difficult for other countries to condemn and call this what it is. So everybody kind of daily dilly-dally around the issue, but never really defining it to what it is because the devil is in the definition. As long as it's not defined properly, then you cannot have the right engagement either to resolve the issue through peaceful means, or even through military means in the way that the SADC countries have done.

LINDSAY:
Those are the countries of Southern Africa.

DIZOLELE:
Exactly. Because DRC is such a big country, it belongs to various organizations. One of them is the East African Community, which I just mentioned, but the other one is the Southern African Development Community. That's where you find Zimbabwe, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, and so on. And those countries have decided they will intervene on behalf of DRC, and that's what has been happening. The Tanzanians, the Malawians, and others are on the side of the DRC. And some of these countries have lost troops in the fighting.
Then on the other side, you have Angola, which is also member of SADC, but they've taken the leadership on what we call the Luanda process. This is peace negotiation between the M23 and DRC and Rwanda as well. So a lot of directions that things are being pulled towards, and it's not clear how all this can now come together.
On top of that is something called the Nairobi process, which was spearheaded by, starting with the former President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, and then was taken over by his successor William Ruto. Those processes are not really turning into anything substantial that is close to peace.

LINDSAY:
I'm glad you raised the issue of Angola. As we sit here talking, representatives from the DRC, I think Rwanda also, M23 are supposed to meet in Luanda to try to talk about how to negotiate a more peaceful outcome. Are you optimistic that those talks can go somewhere? There's often a lot of talk in diplomatic circles, Mvemba, as you know about, conflicts being ripe for resolution. You have to be in a certain place where each of the parties sees an interest in choosing peace over war. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about where we are right now in Eastern Congo?

DIZOLELE:
I am pessimist, although I don't like the term pessimist. I'm realist.

LINDSAY:
Okay, fair enough. I will take your self-description.

DIZOLELE:
No. Yeah, because pessimist is a different thing. I'm just realist. I talked early, Jim, that this been going on for thirty years. So we know how this animal works, the war animal, right? How these dynamics have panned out and how eventually it's panned out.
So people are more into this element, the various actors, especially those with big guns, are more interested in what can I get out of this? And not so much what should we do about peace? That's what you and me and others will be talking about. But that's not what these actors are about. They're not about how do we come to a peace that will then silence the guns forever? Our people will be rich. We're going to create new corridors of economic development and refinement of this product. That's not what they're talking about.
So the notion here is we want to come to Kinshasa, we want to be part of the government. We want our share of four, five, six ministries. We want X numbers of our element to be generals. That is not a recipe for peace, because even if they get to that point, you give it another three years, somebody's going to be unhappy. Somebody will accuse somebody of reneging.
So all these processes also privilege people with guns. So if you go to the Luanda process, it's the belligerents who are there. If you go to the Nairobi process, it's the armed militias that are there. You said well quite a few moments ago that the Kivus are a small part of the country. The rest of the country's not at war. Where are they going to be brought to the negotiation? What do they want? Why is it that their interests, their aspirations are being held hostage by people with big guns and they've been doing this for thirty years? So I'm very realistic in that sense that what I see as of now is not going to lead to peace.

LINDSAY:
On that note of realism born out of some bitter experience over the last thirty years, I'll close up this episode of The President's Inbox. My guest has been Mvemba Dizolele, senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and host of the podcast Into Africa. Mvemba, thank you very much for joining me.

DIZOLELE:
Thank you, Jim, for having me. It's been a pleasure.

LINDSAY:
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As always, opinions expressed on The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's episode was produced by Justin Schuster, with recording engineer Elijah Gonzalez and director of podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. This is Jim Lindsay, thanks for listening.