Trump’s Military Response to Protests: A Conversation on Law and Precedent

Trump’s Military Response to Protests: A Conversation on Law and Precedent

Demonstrators gather in front of California National Guard troops, as protests against immigration sweeps continue, in Los Angeles, California, June 9, 2025.
Demonstrators gather in front of California National Guard troops, as protests against immigration sweeps continue, in Los Angeles, California, June 9, 2025. Daniel Cole/Reuters

The deployment of federal troops in Los Angeles has sparked concerns among some legal experts about the future of civilian-military relations in the United States. Two CFR experts weigh in on the potential implications.

June 16, 2025 2:57 pm (EST)

Demonstrators gather in front of California National Guard troops, as protests against immigration sweeps continue, in Los Angeles, California, June 9, 2025.
Demonstrators gather in front of California National Guard troops, as protests against immigration sweeps continue, in Los Angeles, California, June 9, 2025. Daniel Cole/Reuters
Expert Brief
CFR scholars provide expert analysis and commentary on international issues.

This Expert Brief combines responses to questions posed to Matthew C. Waxman, adjunct senior fellow for law and foreign policy, and Peter Mansoor, CFR member and General Ramond E. Mason Jr. military history chair at Ohio State University. Waxman previously served in the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council. Mansoor was a former U.S. Army Colonel who commanded the First Brigade of the First Armored Division in Iraq from 2003 to 2005.

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On June 6, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents carried out mass raids arresting unauthorized immigrants across Los Angeles and Southern California. The arrests sparked protests outside a federal courthouse in LA. In response, President Donald Trump signed a memorandum authorizing the deployment of at least two thousand National Guard members to protect ICE and federal property. On June 13, about two hundred U.S. Marines arrived in the city to support the National Guard at the president’s order. 

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California Governor Gavin Newsom sued the administration that same day for “unlawfully” bypassing his permission to deploy federal troops to the state after a formal request that the Trump administration retract its troop deployment was ignored. District Judge Charles Breyer, the federal judge on the case, rejected Trump’s rationale for federalizing the troops and ordered the president to relinquish control of the California National Guard. However, a federal appeals court paused Judge Breyer’s ruling to consider the Trump administration’s appeal, allowing the National Guard to remain in LA. Judge Breyer did not rule on the legality of deploying Marines in the state.

What is the Trump administration’s legal justification for deploying the National Guard and U.S. Marines to Los Angeles?

MATTHEW C. WAXMAN: The president has declared that he is sending in federalized National Guard troops and other military personnel, pursuant to a combination of his constitutional and statutory powers, to protect federal personnel and federal government facilities. The essence of his claim is that violent protests threaten these federal instrumentalities and that California state authorities lack the ability or will to protect against those threats. 

PETER MANSOOR: The Trump administration is using the justification of deploying troops to protect federal property, which is a legal reason. But then they go beyond this in their political statements to say that they’re suppressing riots, which is not in the remit of federal forces. The Posse Comitatus Act prevents federal forces from intervening in civilian law enforcement matters within the United States. By deploying the National Guard, in a federalized capacity, and active-duty Marines, the Trump administration is making a political statement that it is tough on crime and that the demonstrations in Los Angeles are a danger to the nation—which is not true.

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How did Trump federalize the National Guard?

MANSOOR: This is an interesting question because the National Guard actually has more authorities when operating under the state governor’s control under Title 32. They can be used in a law enforcement capacity, in that regard. Once they’re federalized by the president, then they fall under federal statutes, and again, the Posse Comitatus Act then applies. By federalizing them, the National Guard has less capacity to intervene in riots and law enforcement matters than they would under a governor’s control. 

Of course, this is the whole point, because Governor Newsom wasn’t about to use the National Guard—there was no need for it. Increased police presence was getting the situation under control, but federalizing the National Guard was the only way that President Trump was going to be able to insert large numbers of military troops into the situation.

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What is the significance of District Judge Breyer’s ruling?

WAXMAN: Among other things, the judge ruled that the president lacked authority to deploy the California National Guard because the situation in Los Angeles did not amount to any real danger of ‘rebellion.’ The opinion essentially suggests violence or threatened violence beyond a certain threshold were not met and that the president’s move violated the state’s constitutional prerogatives.

I was surprised by the ruling, and I think there’s a good chance that it will be reversed on appeal. I say so not because I think the president’s use of the National Guard was needed or wise but because the statute is drafted very broadly and courts usually give very strong deference to the president's assessments of these matters.

Is the Insurrection Act involved, and what is Title 10 of the U.S. Code? 

WAXMAN: So far, the president has not taken the next big step of invoking the Insurrection Act. Doing so would probably put these military forces in the role of directly enforcing law. That would cross a very serious line, especially if California state officials continue to say that they object to the military role.

MANSOOR: Title 10 is the code under which U.S. military forces operate. The Insurrection Act was enacted in 1807 after a potential insurrection by Aaron Burr, vice president at the time, who had killed his opponent, Alexander Hamilton, in a duel. He was thinking about launching an insurrection against the United States president. President Thomas Jefferson then convinced Congress to establish a law that would allow U.S. military forces to be used in a civil law enforcement capacity in order to put down insurrections against the United States.

Has the U.S. military been deployed against American citizens before?

MANSOOR: There’s definitely precedent for the deployment of federal forces in law enforcement issues. President Dwight D. Eisenhower used federal troops, the 101st Airborne Division, to ensure the desegregation of Little Rock High School in Arkansas back in the 1950s. In 1967, federal troops were deployed to Detroit when the city was subject to massive riots. 

Then, in 1992 during the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles, California Governor Pete Wilson requested help from the president. President George H.W. Bush deployed the 7th Infantry Division and other forces to Los Angeles and federalized the National Guard there, as well as invoked the Insurrection Act to allow those troops to be used in a law enforcement capacity, and they were able to quell the riots that had engulfed the city.

When would federal troops be called in to handle state matters of law enforcement, and has law enforcement been insufficient in handling the recent protests in LA?

MANSOOR: So, this is really up to the governor. If the governor feels that they can’t control the violence in one of their cities, the governor can request help from the federal government. But law enforcement is localized in this country, and then after that, it’s a state matter. It very rarely is a federal issue because of all the implications that come with deploying active-duty troops that aren’t exceptionally well trained for law enforcement matters. Active-duty forces should be used sparingly and only as a last resort. And we're far from that in the case of what’s happening in Los Angeles today.

These demonstrations in Los Angeles today are not overly violent. What violence there is has been confined to a very small area. This is a police matter, and yet the president wants to make a political statement, not necessarily because security demands a military presence.

What effect could the deployment of military troops on U.S. civilians have on the country’s civil-military relations?

A law enforcement officer shoots non-lethal weapon at a protestor during a protest against federal immigration sweeps, in Los Angeles, California, U.S., June 11, 2025.
A law enforcement officer shoots non-lethal weapon at a protestor in Los Angeles, California, June 11, 2025. David Swanson/Reuters

MANSOOR: For many years, if not decades, the military has been one of the most revered institutions in the United States, with large-scale and widespread public backing. If you use the military in the sorts of capacities that the Trump administration wants to use them for, it jeopardizes this relationship with the American people, and then the civil-military relationship deteriorates. 

WAXMAN: Keep in mind that this has been a delicate constitutional issue since the birth of the republic. It was a sensitive issue in the drafting of the Constitution and it has remained a sensitive issue ever since.

What are the risks of a federalized response causing protests to spread and potentially lead to new deployments?

WAXMAN: Quelling violence is always difficult, and even when militarized responses are justified, there are of course risks of escalation. That’s true at home as well as abroad, so especially when military forces are deployed to deal with domestic crises, proper training, rules of engagement, and planning are critical. It’s also a reason that collaboration between federal and state governments is usually important. 

MANSOOR: The federalized response to riots in Los Angeles will inspire demonstrations in other cities, not just against ICE and its tactics, but against the use of military forces in civilian law enforcement. If those demonstrations turn violent, they could lure the president to use military forces elsewhere within the United States—creating a dangerous feedback loop with a very uncertain ending.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity. This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

This Expert Brief was compiled and edited by Clara Fong.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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