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Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations. Jack Silverman is an intern for Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Poland and Romania are holding presidential elections on the same day this month that could see successes by right-wing populist parties. What’s at stake for Europe?
A victory of right-wing populists in Romania, and, less likely, in Poland, could make European Union (EU) support for Ukraine more difficult and weaken pro-EU forces on the continent in general.
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The rerun of Romania’s presidential elections on May 4 saw right-wing populist George Simion garnering around 40 percent of first round votes. Though polling is tight, Simion has a good chance of winning the upcoming election. Romania’s constitutional court had annulled the results of the November election, which was clouded by concerns of Russian interference in favor of an anti-Ukraine ultranationalist candidate.
Simion—a vocal admirer of U.S. President Donald Trump and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—supports cutting military aid to Ukraine and has repeatedly criticized the primacy of EU law. He will face off against centrist, pro-EU Bucharest Mayor Nicușor Dan on Sunday in a runoff vote. If Simion wins, he could prove to be an obstructionist within the European Union in the mold of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, or Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.
The Polish presidential election is likely to result in a runoff between the centrist Civic Coalition candidate and Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski and right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) candidate, Karol Nawrocki. If Trzaskowski wins the election, the ruling Civic Coalition government is expected to implement broad reforms to reverse Poland’s democratic backsliding, which have been blocked by current PiS President Andrzej Duda.
PiS won both the Polish parliamentary elections and the presidency in 2015. The party has been criticized for installing loyalists in the judiciary, seizing control of public media, and curtailing civil liberties. Trzaskowski’s victory would also strengthen Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-EU approach to domestic politics.
What consequences would a right-wing victory in Poland or Romania have for Europe’s Ukraine policy?
In Romania, Simion’s antipathy toward Ukraine is well-documented. He is banned from entering Ukraine for spreading misinformation about the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine, a claim which led Ukrainian officials to raise concern about Romanian territorial claims on parts of Ukraine under the guise of protecting ethnic Romanians. Simion has followed in the footsteps of far-right candidate Călin Georgescu, who unexpectedly led first-round votes in the canceled November 2024 elections. (Georgescu has been banned from running again after declassified intelligence reports revealed a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign aimed at bolstering his candidacy.) As a member of the European Council, the Romanian presidency has significant say in foreign and European policy. If elected, Simion could block the EU’s support for Ukraine, which requires unanimity among member states.
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Poland has been traditionally one of Ukraine’s strongest allies. It has allocated €3.74 billion ($4.2 billion) in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the war and welcomed the second-highest number of Ukrainian refugees after Germany with almost one million recorded in Poland by April 2025.
But domestically, support for Ukraine and its refugees have come under pressure. A majority in the Polish population is in favor of tougher migration policies, and Polish farmers have raised concerns about cheap agricultural competition from Ukraine. PiS candidate Nawrocki, for example, has vowed to prioritize Polish citizens over Ukrainian refugees when it comes to medical services or schools. Civic Coalition candidate Trzaskowski has also adopted a rather conservative stance on immigration in his campaign. Overall, however, concerns about a Russian threat has been a unifying factor in Polish politics as worries over Poland’s national security remain high in case of a Ukrainian defeat. Unlike in Romania, this demonstrates a high level of continuity in Poland’s Ukraine policy.
Are European right-wing populists emboldened by President Trump?
Recent parliamentary victories for center-left parties in Australia and Canada have indicated global backlash to the rhetoric and policies of the Trump administration. The presidential elections in Poland and Romania, however, will provide early insights into how Europe’s right-wing populist movement could benefit or struggle from a perceived alignment. After the 2024 U.S. presidential elections, Europe’s right-wing populists anticipated a wave of support for movements embracing Trump’s antiestablishment, anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies. Despite initial enthusiasm, Trump’s exceptional unpopularity among the European public has put Europe’s right-wing populists—who usually adopt a nationalistic, U.S.- and NATO-critical view—in a complicated position. Trump himself has weighed in on the Polish election, posting photos with Nawrocki at a White House event, who later claimed Trump told him “you will win.”
While candidates such as Simion and Nawrocki openly embrace a close relationship with Trump (Simion has even self-identified as a “Trumpist”), others have tried to distance themselves from the U.S. president. In February, Jordan Bardella, president of France’s right-wing National Rally (RN), canceled his speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), citing U.S. nationalist figure Steve Bannon’s “gesture referring to Nazi ideology.” The most well-known RN figure, Marine Le Pen, has also criticized Trump’s decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine, calling it “condemnable” and “very cruel,” despite her own party’s anti-Ukraine stance. This suggests that the empowering effect for Europe’s right-wing populists is not necessarily leading to a more coordinated or unified approach by European right-wing populists within Europe or across the Atlantic.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.