from Asia Program
from Asia Program

Lost Decade

The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power 

Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine evaluate the limitations of the Pivot to Asia and offer a compelling vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

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Foreign policy analyses written by CFR fellows and published by the trade presses, academic presses, or the Council on Foreign Relations Press.

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Lost Decade is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for the United States’ present and future. 
 
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Barack Obama administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,” marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In Lost Decade, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot’s strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of U.S. global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward. 
 
The authors stress that the United States has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values. 

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Reviews and Endorsements

Getting Asia right is the single most important issue for American foreign policy. This bracing book must be read by anyone who wants to understand or shape policy. Agree or disagree, this is a perspective that must be reckoned with. 

Dr. Lawrence H. Summers, former U.S. Treasury Secretary

An important and well-researched explanation of the flawed assumptions that underpinned US policy for far too long.

General H.R. McMaster (ret.), former U.S. National Security Advisor

Three administrations in a row, on a bipartisan basis, have now prioritized Asia in key strategic documents. Yet the day-to-day preferences of the U.S. government have demonstrated that this shift exists on paper only, with few concrete resource or force allocation shifts to speak for over a decade of apparent effort. Lost Decade represents an important contribution to help policymakers understand why the long-promised pivot to Asia failed to materialize, and just as important, how America can meet the scale of the challenge in its priority theater.

Representative Mike Gallagher, Chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party

A must-read for foreign policy analysts. Blackwill and Fontaine's diagnosis of U.S.’ failed Pivot to Asia—a ‘historic missed opportunity’—is a compelling explanation of why reordering priorities in American foreign policy is almost too hard.

Dr. Graham Allison, Harvard Professor; Author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydidess Trap?

Lost Decade constitutes an enormously important contribution by two universally respected practitioner-scholars and clearly identifies the actions that need to be taken by the United States and its allies to accomplish the most important task in the world today—ensuring that the elements of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region are absolutely rock solid.

General David Petraeus (ret.), former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

In Lost Decade, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine examine the U.S.’ decade-plus attempt to focus on Asia. Their account details a critical period in the history of U.S. foreign policy, and it discerns lessons directly applicable to today’s policy choices. In calling for a renewed pivot to Asia while maintaining key commitments elsewhere, the authors offer a grand strategic approach to the new world now upon us. All those interested in the great foreign policy issues of our day should read this book.

Governor Jon Huntsman, former U.S. ambassador to China and Russia

Blackwill and Fontaine bring their extensive government and academic experience to bear in documenting the Pivot’s history, and they articulate a new strategic concept that couples a focus on China with other threats that aren’t going away. A must-read for policymakers and others trying to make sense of a world awash with challenges.

Representative Jane Harman, former Congresswoman; Chair, Commission on National Defense Strategy

This authoritative, carefully researched study shows why the pivot never quite materialized...but also explains why it is still needed and what is required for it to become a reality.

Dr. Richard Haass, President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations; former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department

Meticulously researched and powerfully argued, Lost Decade lays out why the United States’ last “pivot” to Asia fell short and why we can’t afford to fall short again. Fontaine and Blackwill take on some of the most fundamental questions in U.S. foreign policy while retaining a sharp focus on practical solutions, making Lost Decade vital reading not just for policymakers, but for anyone interested in the past, present, and future of U.S. grand strategy.

Representative Seth Moulton, Congressman, Massachusetts

Lost Decade raises grand strategic questions about how the United States should deal with China that foreign policy thinkers and practitioners must address. Happily, it provides specific answers that are likely to attract bipartisan support, including a policy “to-do list.” Even China watchers who disagree with the authors’ assumptions and conclusions will find this a valuable read.

Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department

Top Stories on CFR

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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