Ten Key Takeaways From Treasury’s Foreign Exchange Report

Brad W. Setser, a CFR senior fellow specializing in global trade, analyzes the U.S. Treasury Department’s June 2025 Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

The U.S. Treasury Department provides a report to Congress each year detailing and assessing developments in international economic and exchange rate policies. This semi-annual report, required by law, focuses on close U.S. trading partners that make up about 78 percent of U.S. foreign trade in goods and services. Given the substantive changes to trade that the United States has adopted since President Donald Trump returned to the White House, this report takes on new significance this year. Brad W. Setser, a senior economics fellow at CFR, went line by line through the executive summary of the June report and broke down the document’s latest conclusions.

Report on Macroeconomic
and Foreign Exchange
Policies of Major Trading
Partners of the United States

Setser: There are no crazy manipulation designations made for political points or other unexpected surprises in this report, but it is still an important document. This report commits the Treasury to making long overdue technical adjustments to its methodology that will increase the odds that countries are labeled “currency manipulators” in the future. Taiwan is at particular risk, as is China. Let’s dive in.

In this Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury will be vigilant in identifying and taking action against currency manipulation. Treasury will also examine other macroeconomic and financial policies implemented by our trading partners that propagate imbalances or result in an unfair competitive advantage in trade.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

Sounds tough, but this statement is generally in line with past policy. Most recent Treasury secretaries would be comfortable making these points. In fact, Yellen made this clear in 2021, noting that the intentional targeting of exchange rates is “unacceptable.”

There has been a decline in the scale and persistence of foreign exchange intervention among most major U.S. trading partners in recent years, but the damage done is long lasting, including through the reallocation of supply chains and their associated quality jobs, as well as the loss of the homeland’s ability to manufacture critical defense and industrial equipment.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This statement is new, and sets the analytical foundation for looking at past intervention as well as current intervention in future reports. It is also accurate in my view.

The nominal trade-weighted dollar strengthened 9.0% over the four quarters through December 2024, appreciating against advanced economy currencies by 7.7% and emerging market economy currencies by 10.3%.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This is something that is often missed in the discussion about the dollar’s reserve currency status. The dollar is exceptionally strong, even for a reserve currency. And if the dollar had stayed at its 2024 levels, the U.S. trade deficit would almost certainly have kept on growing.

In this Report, Treasury concludes that no major trading partner of the United States engaged in conduct of the kind described in Section 3004 of the 1988 Act during the relevant period.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This is often the only line the press reads—no one was called a manipulator. This isn’t a surprise though. No one was really intervening heavily to hold their currency down in 2024.

In this Report, Treasury finds that no major trading partner met all three criteria under the 2015 Act during the four quarters ending December 2024, such that no major trading partner requires enhanced analysis.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This is 100 percent as expected. The big economies just weren’t active in the foreign exchange market in 2024. This year will likely be different, as intervention tends to pick up when the dollar depreciates. Taiwan, for example, added $10 billion to its reserves in May. If this pace of intervention is sustained for several months, that would almost assure that it would meet the criteria in the next foreign exchange report.

This lack of transparency will not preclude Treasury from designating China if available evidence suggests that it is intervening through formal or informal channels to resist RMB appreciation in the future.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This is probably the most important line in the Executive Summary. China has gotten very good at disguising its intervention. The country’s central bank appears to do very little on its own balance sheets. Instead, all of the activity appears on the balance sheets of the state banks. That won’t stand in the way of a designation going forward, so watch this space. (It is also worth noting that going after China for hidden intervention will require the Treasury career staff to raise their game. This will be much harder than dinging a country for visible intervention.)

Treasury also will consider working with other countries to develop comprehensive measures to address these policies and imbalances in support of a level playing field for American families, workers, and businesses and strong, sustainable, and balanced growth across the global economy.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

Woah, the Trump administration hasn’t ruled out working with other countries—this may not be just an America alone policy. This could be a reference to more G7 work on the issues of global imbalances. France, which will lead the G7 next year, is quite interested in this. This could turn into something real.

Such analysis may include more intensive analysis of market dynamics in circumstances where a central bank is ostensibly intervening to mitigate disorderly market conditions or excess volatility when the domestic currency is under appreciation pressure.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This is an important signal. Countries that intervene always say that they intervene with the intent to “smooth” volatility even if in practice they are targeting a specific level for the currency. Subjecting these claims to more scrutiny is a good change that could have real consequences. Taiwan intervened at the 30 Taiwan dollar to the U.S. dollar mark for most of May.

These means could include the inappropriate use of capital flow measures or macroprudential measures to target the exchange rate for competitive purposes, or inappropriate activity by government investment vehicles apart from the central bank (such as pension funds or sovereign wealth funds) to target the exchange rate for competitive purposes.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

This is new. Until now, the foreign exchange report has ignored the activities of sovereign funds. That makes this shift potentially significant, as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore all have large sovereign funds and large external surpluses.

These may include recommending the use of existing tariff authorities that Congress has delegated to the President and the United States Trade Representative following a manipulation determination by Treasury in its Report to Congress on the Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States.
U.S. Treasury Department Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

Surprising no one, the Trump administration intends to use tariffs to punish countries judged guilty of currency manipulation. This addresses one of the problems of both the 1988 and 2015 trade laws, namely that they don’t specify meaningful penalties for “manipulation.” The tariff authority that Congress delegated to the U.S. Trade Representative is a reference to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which the Trump administration used against Vietnam for unfair trade practices.

Graphics: Lucky Benson