Letter From Saudi Arabia: How the Kingdom Is Focused Inward

Letter From Saudi Arabia: How the Kingdom Is Focused Inward

Workers perform construction on a skyscraper in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Workers perform construction on a skyscraper in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Eliot Blondet/AP

The Saudis are determined to prevent the distractions of their dangerous neighborhood from getting in the way of Vision 2030 and the rapid modernization of their country.

November 22, 2024 2:16 pm (EST)

Workers perform construction on a skyscraper in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Workers perform construction on a skyscraper in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Eliot Blondet/AP
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Michael Froman is president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

RIYADH - This week, I joined some of CFR’s younger members on a fact-finding trip through Saudi Arabia. When we arrived in Riyadh, we couldn’t help but be impressed by the sheer amount of activity pulsing through the capital. It is one giant construction site, with scores, maybe hundreds, of cranes filling the skyline, office buildings abuzz with Saudi and foreign businesspeople, and traffic crawling to a stop.

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I didn’t see a lot of women driving. But every one of the many women we met (as well as the men) commented—almost word for word—on the remarkable social and economic changes that have come to the kingdom over the last seven years under its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS.

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When pressed about the disappearance of the religious police (the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), whether conservative men were resentful of the changes, and how dissent was being managed, there was much less clarity. The Saudis we met were pleased that the religious police had been reined in, but few had insight into the extent of simmering opposition to MBS.

On human rights, they were decidedly coy, referring to “some problems” and “mistakes of the past.” A few questioned whether the kingdom had a human rights problem at all. It wasn’t hard to infer that some Saudis feared that candor would land them in trouble. We heard from some that the regime is effectively using surveillance to keep a lid on any opposition. For now, the Saudis most foreigners meet are enjoying their newfound freedoms and extolling the virtues of the regime.

And there is much to extol. Vision 2030, MBS’s plan to modernize the country and diversify its economy away from oil, is, well, visionary. But importantly, officials seem to be paying as much attention to how they are executing it as they are to how they are selling it to foreign visitors and investors. The plan is ambitious, and while some targets are already being met or exceeded, the government is almost certainly going to face shortfalls and will have to scale back.

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It seems doubtful, for example, that the kingdom will be able to achieve a reasonable return on investment from its efforts to create from scratch an electric vehicle sector at a time of global overcapacity, with none of the automotive ecosystem that exists in China, Europe, or the United States. “The Line,” a 110-mile-long smart city housed in a single building in the city of Neom, is being scaled back to a fraction of its original size, at least for now.

Still, if Saudi Arabia achieves only half of what it seeks to, it will be not only an astounding success in terms of diversifying the economy but also an important demonstration case for the rest of the region of what can be achieved with leadership and determination. Of course, as some of our interlocutors mentioned, it doesn’t hurt that the Saudis have almost unlimited resources and zero democratic constraints. Indeed, some elites expressed skepticism that democracy is the right form of government for Saudi Arabia, arguing that the kingdom could never develop as fast without authoritarian leadership.

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The Saudis are determined to prevent the distractions of their dangerous neighborhood from getting in the way of Vision 2030. Hence their U-turn on Iran, a long-time rival with which they restored ties last year. The normalization of relations with Tehran, as superficial as it might be, takes one potential distraction off the front burner. When pressed on whether Saudi Arabia would support Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy toward Iran, one of our interlocutors noted that the Saudis would have to live with Trump for only four years but with Iran for one thousand years. Adhering to a ceasefire with the Houthi rebels they had been fighting in Yemen and participating in the peace process there removes another potential distraction. The Saudis are audibly tickled by the fact that the United States, not Saudi Arabia, is now bombing the Houthis, recognizing that Riyadh is the ultimate beneficiary.

The Palestinian issue? Despite paying lip service to it over the past several decades, the question has never been all that important to the Saudi leadership. But now, with footage of the war in Gaza playing 24/7 on television and social media, the leadership understands that the Palestinian issue is resonating with the Saudi people and cannot be ignored. Hence the recent hardening of the official position on needing to see a Palestinian state, and not just a pathway to such a state, before normalizing relations with Israel.

That said, when I pressed Saudis as to whether their country would be willing to provide security in Gaza or pay for its rebuilding, I got the distinct impression that their view was that while they might participate at some stage, this was America’s problem to solve. They argued that in not effectively disciplining Israel, the United States broke Gaza and thus should fix it.

Speaking of the United States, the Saudis remain enthusiastic about a bilateral security pact with Washington, separate and apart from a normalization of relations with Israel. Whether that is something two-thirds of the U.S. Senate is likely to ratify is another matter. China, we were told, is all over Saudi Arabia. Like many countries, the kingdom doesn’t want to have to choose between the United States and China. In an ideal world, Saudis would rely on U.S. blood and treasure to defend their country while awarding China, their chief trading partner, major contracts to develop it.

At the end of the day, the United States doesn’t need Saudi oil the way it once did, and China does. And the Saudis are perfectly happy to take Chinese state-owned firms up on their subsidized offers to construct tower after tower. The rubber will meet the road when it comes to digital infrastructure. As the United States and China engage in selective technological decoupling, Saudi Arabia, which wants to play a major role in AI, may well have to pick sides.

Naturally, the Saudis we met wanted to talk about what the incoming Trump administration will mean for their country and the Middle East in general. They were optimistic about the bilateral relationship, given Donald Trump’s affection for the kingdom, but they were puzzled by some of his announced nominees, who are among the political figures most supportive of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

In 1972, the hawkishly anticommunist President Richard Nixon had enough political cover to get away with traveling to China to open relations with the communist government, causing commentators to quip that “only Nixon could go to China.” In the same way, Saudis hope that perhaps Trump, who has the credibility of being an unwavering Netanyahu supporter, can force Israel to accept a real two-state solution.

Maybe only Trump can go to Ramallah, but even if he never pushes for a meaningful two-state solution, as seems most likely, the Saudis will probably not make too much noise. For now, they are looking inward.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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